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Abstract
Many papers proved the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) system, in the asymptotic
framework. The degree of the security has not been discussed in the finite coding-length frame-
work, sufficiently. However, to guarantee any implemented QKD system requires, it is needed to
evaluate a protocol with a finite coding-length. For this purpose, we derive a tight upper bound
of the eavesdropper’s information. This bound is better than existing bounds. We also obtain the
exponential rate of the eavesdropper’s information. Further, we approximate our bound by using
the normal distribution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) was proposed by Bennett & Brassard [1] as a proto-
col (BB84 protocol) sharing secret keys by using quantum communication channel. Their
original protocol assumes a noiseless quantum channel, but any quantum channel has noise
in the realistic case. Hence, the security of the BB84 protocol in this realistic case had
been an open problem for a long time, and has been proved by Mayers [2]. He showed that
the protocol becomes secure when the protocol is constructed by combining classical error
correction and randomly choosing a code for privacy amplification. In his proof, the secure
generation key rate is 1−h(2p)−h(p) where p is the qubit error rate and h(p) is the binary
entropy −p log p− (1−p) log(1−p) and the base of the logarithm is 2. He also gave a bound
of Eve’s information for a finite length code. His discussion was extended to a more realistic
framework by Inamori, Lu¨tkenhaus & Mayers [3].
After Mayers’ proof, Shor & Preskill [4] proved the security based on the method
of Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes[5, 6]. Then, they proved the existence of code
achieving the secure generation key rate 1 − 2h(2p) and pointed the possibility of the se-
cure generation key rate 1 − 2h(p). After their discussion, treating the reliability of CSS
codes, Hamada[7] showed the existence of the code attaining the secure generation key rate
1−2h(p). He also derived a bound of Eve’s information for a finite length code, which yields
the asymptotic secure generation key rate 1−2h(p). However, they did not discuss the com-
plexity of the encoding and decoding[4, 7], while the complexity of privacy amplification is
not so large in Mayers proof[2].
Following these researches, Christandl, Renner, & Ekert [8], Renner, Gisin, & Kraus [9],
and Koashi [10] showed that the asymptotic secure generation key rate 1−2h(p) is attained
when the protocol is constructed by combining classical error correction and randomly choos-
ing. However, they did not give the bound of Eve’s information of the finite-length code,
explicitly. S. Watanabe, R. Matsumoto & Uyematsu [11] considered Eve’s information for
a finite length code based on random privacy amplification, which yields the asymptotic
secure generation key rate 1− 2h(p).
On the other hand, Stucki et al. [12] demonstrated quantum key distribution over 67 km
between Geneva and Lausanne. Kimura et al. [13] succeeded 150 km QKD transmission
with the error rate 8 – 9 %. Also Gobby et al. [14] did 122 km QKD transmission with
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the error rate 8.9 %. Tanaka et al [15] demonstrated a continuous quantum key distribution
over 16.3 km commercial use fiber with 14 days, and Yuan & Shields [16] did it over 20.3 km
installed telecom fiber with 19 hours. In these experiments, they succeeded in realizing the
real system that could become truly secure if the coding system with infinite coding-length.
Hence, there is no implemented system whose security is guaranteed. Thus, it is required to
realize the error correcting code and the privacy amplification for guaranteeing the security
of the implemented QKD system.
However, the required sizes of the error correcting code and the random privacy amplifi-
cation are not clarified for a given quantum bit error rate, e.g., 8 %. Therefore, many QKD
experimental researchers want to know a tighter upper bound of Eve’s information for given
sizes of the classical error correcting code and the random privacy amplification.
In this paper, we derive an upper bound of Eve’s information satisfying the following
conditions, first time. 1) The upper bound depends only on the size of random privacy
amplification. 2) By using this bound, the key generation rate 1−2h(p) can be attained. In
fact, Mayers’ discussion [2] gives the upper bound in the finite-length case, but his discussion
yields the rate 1 − h(2p) − h(p) not the rate 1 − 2h(p). The discussion by S. Watanabe et
al. [11] yields the rate 1 − h(p), but the bound depends on the error correction. Koashi’s
discussion [10] satisfies the conditions 1) and 2), but his discussion does not clearly give the
bound in the finite-length case. Further, the protocol in his paper [10] and his older paper
[17] is slightly different from the simple combination of the classical error correction and the
random privacy amplification. Our upper bound is also better than that by S. Watanabe et
al. [11].
Moreover, it is shown that our evaluation cannot be further improved in the sense of the
exponential rate when the classical error correcting code satisfies a specific condition. In
this case, the exponential rate of our upper bound of Eve’s information can be attained by a
collective attack, which is realized by individual operation to the channel and the collective
operation to Eve’s local memory, while our bound is valid even for the coherent attack,
which includes any Eve’s attacks allowed by the physical principle. That is, any coherent
attack cannot improve the best collective attack in the sense of the exponential rate of Eve’s
information. Indeed, Renner et al. [9] proved that it is sufficient to show the security for
collective attacks for the treatment of the asymptotic key generation rate since any channel
can be approximated by a separable channel by using random permutation. This result
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can be regarded as the extension of Renner’s result to the exponential framework. Also,
this implies that our evaluation gives the optimal (minimum) exponential rate of Eve’s
information.
There is another type of asymptotic treatment else the exponential treatment. In statis-
tics, when the variable obeys the independent and identical distribution, its distribution can
be approximated by the normal distribution. We also succeeded in approximating our up-
per bound by using the normal distribution. In this approximation, we treat the asymptotic
behavior when the size of the random privacy amplification is given as the form 2nh(pˆ×+ǫ(pˆ×))
for the estimate pˆ× of the phase error rate while in the large deviation case (the exponential
rate case) we treat it when the size is given as the form 2nh(pˆ×+ǫ˜(pˆ×)/
√
n), where ǫ and ǫ˜ are
functions of pˆ×.
Here, we should remark that our results cannot be obtained by the combination of existing
results. The main technical point is the relation between Eve’s information and the phase
error probability, which is given in Lemma 2. Owing to this lemma, Eve’s information can
be bounded without any discussion of classical error correcting code for bit error. Further,
in association with the error correction of phase error, we obtain an upper bound of the
average error probability of a modified random coding when minimum Hamming distance
decoding is applied (Lemma 1). Combining these new techniques, we obtain the upper
bounds (Theorems 1 and 2) through a long careful derivation.
In the following, the organization of this paper is explained. First, we briefly explain
classical error correcting code, and describe our protocol using this knowledge in section
II. In section III, we give an upper bound of Eve’s information per one code and that
of Eve’s information per one bit. The random privacy amplification corresponds to the
random coding concerning the phase error. Hence, we treat the average error of random
coding in section IV. Generalized Pauli channel is known as an important class of noisy
channels. In quantum key distribution, the noisy channel does not necessarily belong to this
class. However, if we use linear codes, we can treat any noisy channel as a generalized Pauli
channel. We summarize notations and properties of generalized Pauli channel in section V.
In section VI, we prove the main theorem by assuming a upper bound of Eve’s information
when Eve’s attack is known. In section VII, we derive a relation between the phase error
and Eve’s information. In section VIII, the bound used in section VI is proved by using the
properties of generalized Pauli channel, the bound of average error and the relation obtained
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in section VII.
Further, we give the asymptotic behavior in the two asymptotic frameworks in section III.
Asymptotic formulas for large deviation and limiting distribution are proved in Appendixes
A and B, respectively. Based on this evaluation, we compare our large deviation bound with
the bound by S. Watanabe, R. Matsumoto & Uyematsu [11]. Further, in section IX, we
prove that the exponential rate of our bound of Eve’s information can be attained by the
collective attack under a specific condition.
II. PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe our protocol. Since our protocol employs the method of clas-
sical error correcting code, we first explain classical error correcting code for the preparation
of description of our protocol.
A. Classical error correcting code
When the noise in a binary signal F2 = {0, 1} is symmetry, the binary channel is described
by a probability distribution {p, 1− p}. In this case, when we send a binary string (in Fn2 ),
the noise can be described by a binary string N and is characterized by the distribution P on
Fn2 . Then, when the input signal is described by the random variable X , the output signal
is described by the random variable X+N . Error correcting code is a method removing the
difference N . In an error correcting code with n-bit, we prepare an m-dimensional linear
subspace C of Fn2 , and the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) agree that only elements of
C is sent before the communication. This linear subspace is called a code or a [n,m] code.
In this case, an encoding is given by a linear map G(C) from Fm2 to C. Of course, the map
G(C) is given as an m × n matrix with 0, 1 entries. Hence, when Bob receives an element
out of C, he can find that there exists a noise, and choose the most proper element among
C based on the obtained binary string. Here, we can correct only one element among each
equivalent class [X ] ∈ Fn2/C. More precisely, we choose the most likely noise Γ([X ]) among
each equivalent class [X ]. This element is often called the representative, and the set of
representatives is denoted by Γ. More generally, the decoding process is described by a map
D : Fn2 → Fm2 .
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Hence, when Bob receives X+N , he decode it to X+N−Γ([X+N ]) = X+N−Γ([N ]).
Thus, the decoding error is described by the behavior of the random variable N − Γ([N ]),
and does not depend on the input signal X . When the noise belongs to the set Γ, we can
properly correct the error. The error probability is equal to 1− P (Γ).
Suppose that there exists an eavesdropper (Eve) obtaining some information concerning
the original signal X . In this case, we prepare a linear subspace C ′ of C and Alice sends the
information as an element of C/C ′. That is, when he sends an information corresponding
to [X ] ∈ C/C ′, he chooses one element among [X ] with the equal probability, and sends it.
This operation is called privacy amplification.
B. Our protocol
Using this method, we can reduce Eve’s information. However, it is not easy to evaluate
how much information Eve has in this case. The purpose of this paper is evaluating Eve’s
information. In this case, the probability that Bob recovers the original information correctly
is equal to P(Γ + C ′), where Γ + C ′ := {Γ([X ]) +X ′|X ∈ Fn2 , X ′ ∈ C ′}. In addition, when
we choose each linear subspace C ′ of C with the equal probability and we regard C as Fm2
and C/C ′ as Fm−m˜2 , the function from F
m
2 to F
m−m˜
2 is called the universal hashing function.
This function is can be constructed as an (m − m˜) × m matrix by choosing the elements
with the uniform distribution.
Using this preparation, we briefly describe our protocol for quantum key distribution that
can be realized by small complexity. After this description, we present it precisely. In our
protocol, after quantum communication, Alice and Bob check their basis by using public
channel, announce a part of obtained bits, and estimate the bit error rate p+ and phase error
rate p×. Here, we denote Alice’s remaining bit string with the + basis and the × basis by
X+ and X×, respectively. Similarly, we denote Bob’s remaining bit string by X˜+ and X˜×.
These bit strings are called raw keys. Hence, the rates of 1 in the difference N+ = X+− X˜+
and the difference N× = X× − X˜× are almost equal to p+ and p×, respectively.
Using the following process, Alice and Bob remove their errors and share the bit string
with almost no error. Alice generates another bit string X ′ and sends the bit string K :=
X ′+X+ to Bob. Based on the information K, Bob obtains the information X ′′ := K−X˜+ =
X ′ +N+. Using this method, we can realize a classical channel with the input X ′ and the
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output X ′′. The error rate of this channel is almost equal to p+. By applying classical error
correction to this channel, Alice and Bob can share bit string with almost zero error. In this
case, Alice generates an element X ′ ∈ Fm2 ∼= C, and Bob recovers X ′′′ = D(X ′′). Then, X ′′′
coincides with X ′ in a high probability. Finally, Alice and Bob perform the above mentioned
hashing function for their respective keys. That is, Alice generates the (m− l)×m matrix
A with the rank m − l randomly, and send this matrix. Then, Alice and Bob obtain their
final keys AX ′ and AX ′′′.
Therefore, the rate of final key to the raw key is equal to R = m−l
n
. Roughly speaking, it
is suitable to choose m as an integer a little smaller than (1−h(p+))n, and m˜ as an integer a
little larger than h(p×)n. Then, the generation rate R is almost equal to 1− h(p+)− h(p×).
In the following, we describe our protocol more precisely. For this purpose, we need some
mathematical notations. The quantum system of each quantum signal is the two-dimensional
Hilbert space H2, which is spanned by the {|a〉}a∈F2. We need to fix integers n+, l+, m+,
n×, l×, and m× that describe the size of our code. For a classical error correction, we choose
an m+-dimensional classical code C1,+ in F
n+
2 (an m-dimensional linear space C1,+ of F
n+
2 ),
and an m×-dimensional classical code C1,× in F
n×
2 . We also fix the thresholds k+, k+, k×,
and k×, and the allowable statistical fluctuation δk for each count k of error.
(i) The sender, Alice, and the receiver, Bob, repeat steps (ii)–(iv) for each i.
(ii) Alice chooses a random bit ai and a random bit bi.
(iii) Bob chooses a random bit ci.
(iv) When bi = 0, Alice sends the quantum state |ai〉, otherwise, does the state 1√2(|0〉 +
(−1)ai|1〉. In the following, {|0〉, |1〉} is called the + basis, and { 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), 1√
2
(|0〉−
|1〉)} is called the × basis.
(v) Alice and Bob announce bi and ci and discard any results for bi 6= ci. They obtain
n+ + l+ bits sequence with bi = ci = 0, and n× + l× bits sequence with bi = ci = 1.
(vi) Alice randomly chooses l+ check bits X+,c,1, . . . , X+,c,l+ among n+ + l+ bits with the
+ basis and l× check bits X×,c,1, . . . , X×,c,l+ among n× + l× bits with the + basis,
announces the positions of these bits, and sends their information. They obtain the
estimates pˆ+ and pˆ× with the respective basis. That is, they count the number of error
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bits k+ = |{i|X+,c,i 6= X˜+,c,i}| and k× = |{i|X×,c,i 6= X˜×,c,i}|, where X˜+,c,i and X˜×,c,i
are Bob’s check bits. However, when k+ is greater than the threshold k+, they discard
their remaining bits with the × basis. When k× is greater than the threshold k×, they
discard their remaining bits with the + basis. Further, when k+ is less than the other
threshold k+, they replace k+ by k+. When k× is less than the other threshold k×,
they replace k× by k×.
In the following, we treat only the bit string of the + basis. We denote Alice’s (Bob’s)
remaining n+-bit strings with the + basis by X+ (X˜+). After this process, they apply the
same procedure to the remaining bit strings with the × basis.
(vii) Alice generates Z+ ∈ Fm+2 randomly, and sends Bob G(C1,+)Z+ +X+.
(viii) Bob obtains the signal G(C1,+)Z++X+− X˜+ ∈ Fn+2 . Performing the decoding of the
code C1,+ ≈ Fm+2 , he obtains Z˜+ ∈ Fm+2 .
(ix) Alice chooses m˜ := n×h(k×/l×+ δk×)-dimensional subcode C2,+(Y+, k×) ⊂ Fm+2 based
on random variables Y+ such that any element x 6= 0 ∈ Fm+2 belongs to C2,+(Y+, k×)
with the probability 2
n+h(k×/l×+δk× )−1
2m+−1 .
(x) Alice obtains the secret information Z+ := [Z+]C2,+(Y+,k×) ∈ F
m+
2 /C2,+(Y+, k×).
(xi) Bob obtains the secret information Z+,B :=
[
Z˜+
]
C2,+(Y+,k×)
∈ Fm+2 /C2,+(Y+, k×).
For example, s-dimensional code C2(Y, s) in F
m+
2 is constructed based on k random
variables Y := (X1, · · · , Xs) in Fm+2 as C2(Y, s) := 〈X1, · · · , Xs〉, where Y obeys the uniform
distribution on the set {Y |X1, · · · , Xs are linearly independent.}.
C. Extension of our protocol
Indeed, in the realistic case, the bottleneck is often the estimation error of the error rate.
Hence, in order to decrease the error of the estimation of the phase error rate p×, we propose
the following the modified protocol for any integer a. In the modified protocol, we repace
steps (v) and (vi) by the following, and add the step (xii).
(v) Alice and Bob announce bi and ci and discard any results for bi 6= ci. They obtain
an++ l+ bits sequence with bi = ci = 0, and an×+ l× bits sequence with bi = ci = 1.
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(vi) Alice randomly chooses n+ bits among remaining an+ bits with + basis and obtain
n+ bit string X+. She also sends the her positions to Bob. Bob obtains the n+ bit
string X˜+. They do the same procedure for the × basis.
(xii) They repeat steps (vii) – (xi) a times.
In the above protocol, the estimation of the phase error p× has the same accuracy as that
of the first protocol with al× check bits of the × basis.
III. SECURITY
In this section, we evaluate the security of our protocol. In the following, for simplicity,
we abbreviate l× and n+ by l and n, respectively.
A. Finite-length case
The security of this protocol is evaluated by the mutual information I(Z+, ZE) between
Alice’s final key Z+ and eavesdropper(Eve)’s information ZE. It is mathematically defined
by
I(Z+, ZE) :=−
∑
ZE
P (ZE) logP (ZE)
+
∑
Z+
P (Z+)
∑
ZE
P (ZE|Z+) logP (ZE|Z+).
In order to evaluate this value, we have to treat the hypergeometric distribution
Phg(k|n, l, j) := (
l
k)(
n
j−k)
(n+lj )
. This is because the random sampling obeys the hypergeomet-
ric distribution. It is known that its average is lj
n+l
and its variance is jln(n+l−j)
(n+l)2(n+l−1) . In this
paper, we focus on the average of Eve’s information Epos×,k×,Y+|pos+,k+,Y×[I
(
Z+, ZE
)
] for each
n, l, where pos+ and pos× are the random variables indicating the positions of the check bit
of × basis and + basis, respectively. Some papers [2, 4, 10, 11, 17] guarantee the security
by proving that for any ǫ1 > 0 and ǫ2 > 0 there exist integers n and l such that
P (I
(
Z+, ZE
) ≥ ǫ2) ≤ ǫ1. (1)
Indeed, when Epos×,k×,Y+|pos+,k+,Y×
[
I
(
Z+, ZE
)] ≤ ǫ1ǫ2, Markov inequality guarantees the
inequality (1). Hence, we can recover the probabilistic behavior (1) of Eve’s information from
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the evaluation of the average of Eve’s information. Therefore, in this paper, we concentrate
the evaluation of the average of Eve’s information.
Theorem 1 When R is the rate of the code C1 and the threshold k is less than
n
2
, we have
Epos×,k×,Y+|pos+,k+,Y×
[
I
(
Z+, ZE
)] ≤ P (δ, n, l, k, k), (2)
where
P (δ, n, l, k, k) :=max
j
h¯
( k∑
k=0
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk) +
k∑
k=k+1
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk)
)
+max
j
[ k∑
k=0
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk)n(R− h(k/l + δk))
+
k∑
k=k+1
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk)n(R− h(k/l + δk))
]
,
and
h¯(x) :=

 h(x) x < 1/21 x ≥ 1/2
f(k′, k|n, l, δ) :=

 min{2
n(h(k
′
n
)−h(k
l
+δ)), 1} if k′ < n/2
1 if k′ ≥ n/2.
Further, Eve’s information per one bit is evaluated as follows.
Theorem 2 When R is the rate of the code C1, we have
Epos×,k×,Y+|pos+,k+,Y×
[
I
(
Z+, ZE
)
n(R − h(k×/l× + δk×))
]
≤P˜ (δ, n, l, k, k),
where
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P˜ (δ, n, l, k, k)
:=max
j
1
n(R− h(k/l + δk))
h¯
( k∑
k=0
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk) +
k∑
k=k+1
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk)
)
+max
j
[ k∑
k=0
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk) +
k∑
k=k+1
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk)
]
.
The proofs of these theorems are divided into two parts: (i)The security of known channel
(section VIII), (ii)The security of unknown channel, which is given by estimating the channel
and employing the part (i) (section VI). For treatment of quantum channel, we prepare the
notations of generalized Pauli channel in section V. For the discussion of the part (i), we
derive a bound of average error concerning classical error correcting code in Section IV, and
a bound of Eve’s information using the phase error in Section VII.
B. Approximation using normal distribution
In the following, we calculate the above value approximately. For this purpose, we choose
two probabilities p < p < 1
2
, and a continuous function p 7→ ǫ˜(p). When k = pl, k = pl,
n
n+l
= r, δk =
ǫ˜(p)√
n+l
, as is shown in Appendix A, we obtain
lim
n→∞
P˜ (δ, n, l, k, k) = max
p∈[p,p]
Φ
(
−
√
r(1− r)√
p(1− p) ǫ˜(p)
)
, (3)
where the distribution function Φ of the standard Gaussian distribution:
Φ(x) :=
∫ x
−∞
1
2π
e−x
2/2dx.
Hence, in order to keep the security level ε per one bit, it is suitable to choose δk to be
− 1√
n+l
√
k
l
(1− k
l
)√
n
n+l
l
n+l
Φ−1(ε) = −
√
n+l
nl
√
k
l
(1− k
l
)Φ−1(ε) when P˜ (δ, n, l, k, k) can be approximated
by the RHS of (3). That is, our upper bound is almost determined by
√
nl
n+l√
k
l
(1− k
l
)
δk.
Now, we consider the case when we use a low-density-parity-check (LDPC) code as the
code C1 [18]. In this case, the case of R = 0.5, and n = 10, 000 is one realistic case. As
an realistic case, let us consider the case l = 1, 000, p = 0.075, δk× = 0.01. Then, we
have−
√
nl
n+l√
k
l
(1− k
l
)
δk = −1.14. The security level Φ
(− √ nln+l√
k
l
(1− k
l
)
δk
)
= 0.126 is not sufficient.
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However, it is not easy to increase the size n. Hence, we adopt the modified protocol. In
this case, we replace only l by the following values. In the case of l = 20, 000, the security
level is almost 0.001.
l 1,0000 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000
−
√
nl
n+l√
k
l
(1− k
l
)
δk −1.14 −2.68 −3.10 −3.29 −4.00 −3.47
Φ
(− √ nln+l√
k
l
(1− k
l
)
δk
)
0.126 0.00363 0.000968 0.000505 0.000342 0.000264
C. Large deviation
Next, we focus on the large deviation type evaluation. Choose a function p ∈ [p, p] 7→ ǫ(p)
and define
E(ǫ, r, p, p) := min
p∈[p,p],ǫ′≥0
[
h(p+ r(ǫ(p)− ǫ′))
− (1− r)h(p)− 2rh(p+ ǫ(p)− ǫ′)
+ rh(p+ ǫ(p))
]
.
When k = pl, r = n
n+l
, δk = ǫ(
k
l
), as is shown in Appendix B, we obtain
E(ǫ, r, p, p) = lim
n→∞
−r
n
logP (δ, n, l, k, k). (4)
Further,
P (δ, n, l, k, k) ≤k(n+ l + 1)n(R− h(p + δp))2−nr E(ǫ,r,p,p)
+ h(k(n+ l + 1)2
−n
r
E(ǫ,r,p,p)). (5)
Hence, given a fixed real number E, it is suitable to choose ǫ(p) satisfying that
E =min
ǫ′≥0
[
h(p+ r(ǫ(p)− ǫ′))− (1− r)h(p)
− 2rh(p+ ǫ(p)− ǫ′) + rh(p+ ǫ(p))]
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for any probability p ∈ [p, p]. Further, when ǫ(p) is sufficiently small, using the relation
d(p‖q) := p log p
q
+ (1− p) log 1−p
1−q
∼= (p−q)2p(1−p) ln 2 , we have the approximation.
h(p+ r(ǫ(p)− ǫ′))− (1− r)h(p)− rh(p+ (ǫ(p)− ǫ′))
+ rh(p+ ǫ(p))− rh(p+ (ǫ(p)− ǫ′))
=(1− r)d(p‖p+ r(ǫ(p)− ǫ′)) + rd(p+ ǫ(p)‖p+ r(ǫ(p)− ǫ′))
+ r(h(p+ ǫ(p))− h(p+ (ǫ(p)− ǫ′)))
∼=(1− r)r
2(ǫ(p)− ǫ′)2
p(1− p) + r
(1− r)2(ǫ(p)− ǫ′)2
p(1− p) + rh
′(p)ǫ′.
In this approximation, when ǫ(p) is small enough, the minimum is attained at ǫ′ = 0. Hence,
min
ǫ′≥0
[
h(p+ r(ǫ(p)− ǫ′))− (1− r)h(p)− rh(p+ ǫ(p)− ǫ′)
+ rh(p+ ǫ(p))− rh(p+ ǫ(p)− ǫ′)]
=h(p+ rǫ(p))− (1− r)h(p)− rh(p+ ǫ(p)). (6)
The maximum value of ǫ(p) satisfying (6) corresponds to the critical rate in the classical
channel coding theory. Therefore, when the number ǫ(p) is sufficiently small for each p ∈
[p, p], we obtain
E = h(p+ rǫ(p))− (1− r)h(p)− rh(p+ ǫ(p)) (7)
∼= r(1− r)ǫ(p)
2
(log 2)(p+ rǫ(p))(1− (p+ rǫ(p))) , ∀p ∈ [p, p].
Hence, in this case, in order to keep the exponential rate E, we choose ǫ(p) as
ǫ(p) =
(ln 2)Er(1− 2p)
2(r(1− r) + (ln 2)Er2)
+
√
(ln 2)2E2r2 + 4p(1− p)r(1− r)(ln 2)E
2(r(1− r) + (ln 2)Er2)
∼=
√
p(1− p)√
r(1− r)
√
(ln 2)E as E → 0.
Here, we compare our bound with that by S. Watanabe, R. Matsumoto & Uyematsu
[11]. Since their protocol is different from our protocol, we compare our protocol with their
protocol with the same size of code. This is because the size of the code almost corresponds
to the cost of its realization. Then, their case corresponds to our case with p = p = p and
l = n. They derived the following upper bound (8) of the security in their protocol when
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the codes C2 ⊂ C1 satisfy the following conditions: The codes C1/C2 and C⊥2 /C⊥1 have the
decoding error probability ε when the channel is the binary symmetric channel with the
error probability p.
Epos×,k×|pos+,k+
[
I
(
Z+, ZE
)]
≤h(2(n
2
+ 1)2ε+ 4(n+ 1)2e−
ǫ(p)2
4
n)
+ 4n(
n
2
+ 1)2ε+ 8n(n+ 1)2e−
ǫ(p)2
4
n. (8)
However, even if the error probability ε is zero, our evaluation (5) is better than their
evaluation (8). In particular, when ǫ(p) is sufficiently small, we can use (6). From Pinsker
inequality: (ln 2)d(p‖q) ≥ (p− q)2[19], our exponential rate is evaluated as
ln 2
r
(h(p+ rǫ(p))− (1− r)h(p)− rh(p+ ǫ(p)))
=
ln 2
r
((1− r)d(p‖p+ rǫ(p)) + rd(p+ ǫ(p)‖p+ rǫ(p)))
≥(1− r)ǫ(p)2 = ǫ(p)
2
2
,
which is greater than their rate ǫ(p)
2
4
even in the case of ǫ′ = 0. Further, our coefficient is
smaller than their coefficient in this case as follows:
k(n+ l + 1)n(R− h(p+ δp))
≤pn(n + n+ 1)nR < 8n(n+ 1)2,
k(n+ l + 1) = pn(n+ n + 1) < 4(n+ 1)2
because p ≤ 1/2.
Hence, in order to obtain a tighter bound, it is better to use our formula (2).
IV. ERROR CORRECTING CODE
A. Type method
In this section, we treat classical error correcting code. For this purpose, we review the
type method for binary strings. For any element x ∈ Fn2 , we define |x| := |{i|xi = 1}| and
T kn := {x ∈ Fn2 | |x| = k}. Further, the number of elements is evaluated by
1
n + 1
2nh(k/n) ≤ |T kn | =
(
n
k
)
≤ | ∪k′≤k T k′n | ≤ 2nh(k/n) (9)
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for k ≤ n/2. For any distribution P on Fn2 , we define distribution P˜ on {0, . . . , n} and Pk
on T kn as
P˜ (k) := P (T kn )
Pk(x) :=


P (x)
P˜ (k)
, if x ∈ T kn
0 otherwise.
Hence, we have
P (x) =
n∑
k=0
P˜ (k)Pk(x).
B. Bound for random coding
In this paper, we focus on linear codes, which are defined as linear subspaces of Fn2 . For
the preoperation of the following section, we consider the error probability when the noise
of classical communication channel is given as a classical channel W (a stochastic transition
matrix) on Fn2 . If a channel W is written by a distribution PW on F
n
2 as
W (y|x) = PW (y − x),
it is called an additive channel. For an additive channel W , we define the following distri-
bution:
PW (k) := PW{x||x| = k}.
In order to protect our message from the noise, we often restrict our message to be sent in a
subset of Fn2 . This subset is called a code. When the noise is given by an additive channel,
a linear subspace C of Fn2 is suitable for our code because of the symmetry of the noise.
Hence, in the following, we call a linear subspace C of Fn2 a code.
Now, for a preoperation of the following section, we consider the error correcting code
using a pair of codes C1 ⊂ C2. In order to send any information [x2]1 ∈ C2/C1, we send
x1+x2 by choosing x1 ∈ C1 with the uniform distribution, where [x]i denotes the equivalent
class divided by Ci. In this case, the decoder is described by the map D from F
n
2 to itself.
When the channel is given by W , the average error probability is
Pe,W (D)
=
1
|C2/C1|
∑
[x2]1∈C2/C1
1
|C1|
∑
x1∈C1
∑
D(y)6=[x2]
W (y|x2 + x1).
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However, we often describe our decoder by the coset representative Γ([x]2) for each [x]2 ∈
Fn2/C2. That is, when the decoder receives the element y, he decodes it to D
Γ(y) :=
[y − Γ([y]2)]1. When the channel is given by a additive channel W , the error probability is
Pe,W (D
Γ) = 1− PW (Γ + C1),
where Γ := {Γ([x]1)|[x]1 ∈ Fn2/C2}, and Γ + C1 = {x + x1|x ∈ Γ, x1 ∈ C1}. For example,
when we choose the minimum Hamming distance decoding DC2/C1 :
DC2/C1(y) := argmin
[x2]1∈C2/C1
min
x1∈C1
|y − (x1 + x2)|.
By using the map Γ([x]2):
Γ([x]2) = x+ argmin
x2∈C2
|x+ x2|,
it can be written as
DC2/C1(y) = [y − Γ([y]2)]1.
In the following, we denote the above Γ by ΓC2 .
Now, we consider the average error when we choose the larger code C2 randomly.
Lemma 1 Let C1 be a arbitrary [n,t] code (C1 ⊂ Fn2 ). We randomly choose the t + l-
dimensional code C2(X) ⊃ C1 such that any element x ∈ Fn2 \C1 belongs to C2(X) with the
probability 2
l+t−2t
2n−2t . Then, any additive channel W satisfies
EX [Pe,W (D
ΓC2(X))] = EX [1− PW (ΓC2(X) + C1)]
≤
n∑
k=0
P˜W (k)g(2
l+t−n|n, k),
where
g(x|n, k) :=

 min{2
nh(k/n)x, 1} k ≤ ⌊n/2⌋
1 k > ⌊n/2⌋.
Proof: Let T nk be the set {x ∈ Fn2 ||x| = k}. Then, P (x) =
∑n
k=0 P˜ (k)Pk(x). Hence,
P (ΓC2(X) + C1) =
∑n
k=0 P˜ (k)Pk(ΓC2(X) + C1).
Indeed, if y ∈ T nk ⊂ Fn2 does not belong to ΓC2(X) + C1, there exists an element x ∈
C2(X) \ C1 such that |y − x| ≤ k. Hence, the probability that at least one element belongs
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to the set {x||x− y| ≤ k} is less than 2nh(k/n) 2l+t−2t
2n−2t for k ≤ n/2 because |{x||x− y| ≤ k}| =
|{z||z| ≤ k}| ≤ 2nh(k/n). (See (9).) Therefore,
EX [1− Pk(ΓC2(X) + C1)]
≤
∑
y∈T kn
Pk(y)2
nh(k/n)2
l+t − 2t
2n − 2t
≤2nh(k/n)2
l+t − 2t
2n − 2t ≤ 2
nh(k/n)2
l+t
2n
for k ≤ n/2, where the last inequality follows from l+ t ≤ n. This value is also bounded by
1. Hence,
EX [1− P (ΓC2(X) + C1)]
=
n∑
k=0
P˜ (k)EX [1− Pk(ΓC2(X) + C1)]
≤
n∑
k=0
P˜ (k)g(2l+t−n|n, k).
V. GENERALIZED PAULI CHANNEL
In this section, for the preparation of our proof, we give some notations concerning
generalized Pauli channels. In order to describe it, for any two elements x = (x1, . . . , xn), y =
(y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Fn2 , we use the product:
x · y :=
n∑
i=1
xiyi.
Thus, the space H⊗n2 = (C2)⊗n is spanned by the {|x〉}x∈Fn2 . Now, we define the unitary
matrices Xx and Zz for x, z ∈ Fn2 as:
Xx|x′〉 = |x′ − x〉
Zz|x′〉 = (−1)x′·z|x′〉.
From the definition, we have the relation [20].
(XxZz)(Xx
′
Zz
′
) = (−1)x·z′−x′·z(Xx′Zz′)(XxZz).
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When the channel Λ has the form:
Λ(ρ) =
∑
x,z∈Fn2
PΛ(x, z)(X
xZz)ρ(XxZz)†,
it is called a generalized Pauli channel. Indeed, a generalized Pauli channel is a quantum
analogue of an additive channel. In fact, it is known [21, 22] that the channel Λ is generalized
Pauli if and only if
Λ(ρ) = (XxZz)†Λ((XxZz)ρ(XxZz)†)(XxZz), ∀x, z ∈ Fn2 . (10)
For any channel Λ, we often focus on its twirling Λt defined as
Λt(ρ) :=
1
22n
∑
x,z∈Fn2
Λx,z(ρ)
Λx,z(ρ) := (XxZz)†Λ((XxZz)ρ(XxZz)†)(XxZz).
From (10), the twirling Λt is always a generalized Pauli channel.
In the treatment of generalized Pauli channels, the distribution PΛ(x, z) is important.
Hence, we introduce some notations for this distribution. We define the distributions PΛ,X(x)
and PΛ,Z(z) as
PΛ,X(x) :=
∑
z∈Fn2
PΛ(x, z), PΛ,Z(z) :=
∑
x∈Fn2
PΛ(x, z).
These are called marginal distributions. We also define the conditional distribution as
PΛ,Z|X(z|x) := PΛ(x, z)
PΛ,X(x)
.
Next, we treat a generalized Pauli channel Λ on the tensor product system (C2)⊗n1⊗(C2)⊗n2.
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In this case, we use the following notation.
PΛ,1(x1, z1) :=
∑
x2,z2∈Fn22
PΛ(x1x2, z1z2)
PΛ,2(x2, z2) :=
∑
x1,z1∈Fn12
PΛ(x1x2, z1z2)
PΛ,X,i(xi) :=
∑
zi∈Fni2
PΛ,i(xi, zi)
PΛ,Z,i(zi) :=
∑
xi∈Fni2
PΛ,i(xi, zi)
P˜Λ,Z,1,2(k1, k2) :=
∑
xi∈Fni2
PΛ,Z(T
k1
n1
× T k2n2 ) (11)
PΛ,1|Z,2(x1, z1|z2) :=
∑
x2∈Fn22 PΛ,1|Z,2(x1x2, z1z2)
PΛ,Z,2(z2)
PΛ,Z,1|Z,2(z1|z2) :=
∑
x1∈Fn12
PΛ,1|Z,2(x1, z1|z2).
Note that P˜Λ,Z,1,2 is different from P˜Λ,Z . These notations will be used in the following
sections.
VI. PROOF OF MAIN THEOREM
A. Modified protocol
In this section, we prove Theorem 1 by treating the security of the following protocol. In
the following protocol, we fix the generalized Pauli channel Λ from n-qubits system to itself.
(i) Alice generates Z+ ∈ Fm2 randomly, and sends Bob G(C1)Z+ ∈ Fn2 with the + basis
through the n-qubits generalized Pauli channel Λ.
(ii) Bob measures the received n qubits with the + basis. Performing the decoding of the
code C1 ≈ Fm2 , he obtains Z˜+ ∈ Fm2 .
(iii) They do the processes (ix) – (xi) of the previous protocol. In this case, we assume
that the dimension of the code C1 (the subcode C2,+(Y+)) is t (s).
This protocol is the special case that the channel is known.
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For any channel Λ from the system H to itself, the state on the environment system can
be described by using its Stinespring representation (HE , U, |0〉E ∈ HE):
Λ(ρ) = TrHE Uρ⊗ |0〉E E〈0|U∗.
That is, the state on the environment system is characterized by another channel ΛE(ρ) :=
TrHn2 Uρ⊗ |0〉E E〈0|U∗.
In this above protocol, the distribution of Eve’s signal ZE is described by a POVM MZE
on HE as P (ZE|Z) = TrMZEΛE(ρZ). Therefore, in order to evaluate the classical mutual
information I(Z,ZE) it is sufficient to evaluate the quantum mutual information (Holevo
information)
I([z] ∈ C1/C2(Y ), ρC1/C2(Y )Λ,E ([z]))
:=
1
2m−s
∑
[z]∈C1/C2(Y )
Tr ρ
C1/C2(Y )
Λ,E ([z])
·
(
log ρ
C1/C2(Y )
Λ,E ([z])− log ρC1/C2(Y )Λ,E
)
, (12)
where ρ
C1/C2(Y )
Λ,E ([z]) :=
∑
z2∈C2(Y ) ΛE(|z + z2〉 〈z + z2|) and ρ
C1/C2(Y )
Λ,E :=
1
2t−s
∑
[z]∈C1/C2(Y ) ρ
C1/C2(Y )
Λ,E ([z]). In the following, we often abbreviate (12) as IH(Z,ZE).
Theorem 3 We can evaluate Eve’s information as follows.
EY+
[
I([z] ∈ C1/C2(Y+, s), ρC1/C2(Y )Λ,E ([z]))
]
≤ηm−s
( n∑
k=0
P˜Λ,Z(k)g(2
−s|n, k)
)
,
where m = dimC1 and ηk is defined as
ηk(x) := h(x) + kx.
This theorem will be proved in Section VIII.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Now, we back to our main protocol. First, we fix the random variables pos+, k+, Y×.
Then, it is sufficient to treat the quantum system of the n+ + l× qubits. In the following,
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we characterize the system of raw keys Cn by the subscript k, and the other system of check
qubits Cl× by the subscript c.
Hence, we denote the quantum channel of this system by Λ. Note that Λ is not necessarily
generalized Pauli. In the following, we abbreviate l×, pos×, k×, Y+ by l, pos, k, Y , respectively.
In this case, the variable pos takes a subset of l elements {i1, . . . , il} ⊂ {1, . . . , n + l},
where i1 < . . . < il. Then, we define the unitary matrix Upos as
Upos(ui1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ uil ⊗ uj1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ujn) = u1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ un+l,
where {j1, . . . , jn} = {i1, . . . , il}c and j1 < · · · < jn. Every subset is choosed with the
probability 1
(n+ll )
. We also define the channel Λpos for any channel Λ as
Λpos(ρ) := U †pos(Λ(UposρU
†
pos))Upos.
Then, we can show that
(Λpos)t = (Λt)
pos. (13)
Hence, any generalized Pauli channel Λ satisfies
Epos
[
P˜Λpos,Z,k,c(kk, kc)
]
=P˜Λ,Z(kk + kc)Phg(kc|n, l, kk + kc), (14)
where we used the notation given in (11).
Now, we consider the case where Alice and Bob choose the variable pos and obtain the
difference zc between their check bit with the × basis. When k ≤ |zc| ≤ k, the average of
Eve’s final information is evaluated as
EY+
[
I([z] ∈ C1/C2(Y+, nh( |zc|
l
+ δ|zc|)), ρ
C1/C2(Y )
(Λt)pos,z ,E
([z]))
]
≤h
( n∑
k=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z,k|Z,c(k|zc)f(k, |zc| |n, l, δk)
)
+ n(R − h(|zc|/l + δk))
·
n∑
k=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z,k|Z,c(k|zc)f(k, |zc| |n, l, δk). (15)
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When |zc| < k, we obtain
EY+
[
I([z] ∈ C1/C2(Y+, nh(k
l
+ δk)), ρ
C1/C2(Y )
(Λt)pos,z,E
([z]))
]
≤h
( n∑
k=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z,k|Z,c(k|zc)f(k, k|n, l, δk)
)
+ n(R− h(k/l + δk))
·
n∑
k=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z,k|Z,c(k|zc)f(k, k|n, l, δk). (16)
Of course, when |zc| > k, the average of Eve’s final information is equal to zero because
any information is discarded in this case. The inequalities (15) and (16) will be shown in
Appendix C by using Theorem 3.
Finally, we take the expectation concerning zc and pos:
EposEzcEY+
[
I([z] ∈ C1/C2(Y+, nh(|zc|/l + δ|zc|)), ρC1/C2(Y )(Λt)pos,z ,E([z]))
]
≤h
(
max
j
[ k∑
kc=0
Phg(kc|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk) +
k∑
kc=k+1
Phg(kc|n, l, j)f(j − kc, kc|n, l, δkc)
])
+max
j
[ k∑
kc=0
Phg(kc|n, l, j)n(R− h(k/l + δk))f(j − k, k|n, l, δk)
+
k∑
kc=k+1
Phg(kc|n, l, j)n(R− h(kc/l + δkc))f(j − kc, kc|n, l, δk+c)
]
. (17)
This inequality will be proved in Appendix D. Hence, we obtain Theorem 1. Similarly, we
have
EposEzcEY+
[
I([z] ∈ C1/C2(Y+, nh(|zc|/l + δ|zc|)), ρC1/C2(Y )(Λt)pos,z ,E([z]))
n(R − h(k×/l× + δk×))
]
≤ 1
n(R − h(k/l× + δk))
h
(
max
j
[ k∑
kc=0
Phg(kc|n, l, j)f(kk, k|n, l, δk) +
k∑
kc=k+1
Phg(kc|n, l, j)f(kk, kc|n, l, δkc)
])
+max
j
[ k∑
kc=0
Phg(kc|n, l, j)f(kk, k|n, l, δk) +
k∑
kc=k+1
Phg(kc|n, l, j)f(kk, kc|n, l, δk+c)
]
, (18)
This inequality will be proved in Appendix D. Hence, we obtain Theorem 2.
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VII. SECURITY AND PHASE ERROR
In this section, we treat the relation between Eve’s information and the phase error. This
relation is one of essential parts for Theorem 3. The purpose of this section is proving the
following lemmas[28].
Lemma 2 Let Λ be a generalized Pauli channel on the system (C2)⊗n. Then, we have
I(x ∈ Fn2 ,ΛE(|x〉〈x|)) ≤ ηn(1− PΛ,Z(0)). (19)
Since 1−PΛ,Z(0) can be regarded as the phase error, this lemma gives a relation between
the phase error and Eve’s information.
Proof: The Stinespring representation of Λ is given as ((C2)⊗2n, U, |φ〉):
|φ〉 :=
∑
x,z∈Fn2
√
PΛ(x, z)|x, z〉
U :=
∑
x,z∈Fn2
XxZz ⊗ |x, z〉〈x, z|.
Since
U |x′〉 ⊗ |φ〉 =
∑
x,z∈Fn2
√
PΛ(x, z)(−1)x′·z|x′ − x〉 ⊗ |x, z〉
=
∑
x∈Fn2
|x′ − x〉 ⊗ |φx,x′〉 ⊗
√
PΛ,X(x)|x〉,
Eve’s state can be written as
ΛE(|x′〉〈x′|) =
∑
x∈Fn2
PΛ,X(x)|φx,x′〉〈φx,x′| ⊗ |x〉〈x|,
where |φx,x′〉 :=
∑
z∈Fn2
√
PΛ,Z|X(z|x)(−1)x′·z|z〉. Since x′ obeys the uniform distribution,
I(x ∈ Fn2 ,ΛE(|x〉〈x|))
=
∑
x∈Fn2
PΛ,X(x)H(
1
2n
∑
x′∈Fn2
|φx,x′〉〈φx,x′|)
=
∑
x∈Fn2
PΛ,X(x)H(PΛ,Z|X(·|x)) ≤ H(PΛ,Z).
Hence, using Lemma 3, we obtain (19).
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Lemma 3 Let P = {P (i)} be a distribution on {0, . . . , d−1}. Then, H(P ) ≤ h(1−P (0))+
log(d− 1)(1− P (0)).
Proof:
H(P ) =− P (0) logP (0)− (1− P (0)) log(1− P (0))
− (1− P (0))
d−1∑
i=1
P (i)
(1− P (0)) log
P (i)
(1− P (0))
≤h(1− P (0)) + log(d− 1)(1− P (0)).
VIII. SECURITY OF KNOWN CHANNEL
In this section, we treat the security when the channel is known, i.e., prove Theorem 3
using Lemmas 2 and 1. To prove it, for any code C ⊂ Fn2 and any elements [z] ∈ Fn2/C⊥
and [x] ∈ Fn2/C, we define
|x, z〉C := 1√|C|
∑
x′∈C
(−1)z·x′|x+ x′〉. (20)
Note that this definition does not depend on the choice of the coset representative elements
z (x) of [z] ([x]). When we choose Fn2 as C, the above is the discrete Fourier transform.
Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4 When two codes C1 and C2 satisfy C2 ⊂ C1, any elements x ∈ Fn2 , [z1] ∈ C⊥2 /C⊥1 ,
and [z2] ∈ Fn2/C⊥2 satisfy
|x, z1 + z2〉C1
=
1√|C1/C2|
∑
[x1]∈C1/C2
(−1)(z1+z2)·x1 |x+ x1, z2〉C2 . (21)
Note that the RHS does not depend of the choice of the coset representative elements x1 of
[x1].
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Proof:
1√|C1/C2|
∑
[x1]∈C1/C2
(−1)(z1+z2)·x1|x+ x1, z2〉C2
=
1√|C1/C2|
∑
[x1]∈C1/C2
1√|C2|
·
∑
x2∈C2
(−1)(z1+z2)·x1+z2·x2|x+ x1 + x2〉.
Since (z1 + z2) · (x1 + x2) = (z1 + z2) · x1 + z2 · x2, we obtain (21).
Lemma 5 ∑
x1∈C1
|x+ x1〉〈x+ x1| =
∑
[z1]∈Fn2 /C⊥1
|x, z1〉C1 C1〈x, z1|. (22)
Proof: From the definition of |x, z1〉C1 , we have∑
[z1]∈Fn2 /C⊥1
|x, z1〉C1 C1〈x, z1|
=
1
|C1|
∑
[z1]∈Fn2 /C⊥1
∑
x′∈C1
∑
x′′∈C1
(−1)z1·(x′+x′′)|x+ x′′〉〈x+ x′|
=
1
|C1|
∑
[z1]∈Fn2 /C⊥1
∑
x′∈C1
∑
x′′∈C1
(−1)z1·(x′+x′+(x′′−x′))|x+ x′ + x′′ − x′〉〈x+ x′|
=
1
|C1|
∑
[z1]∈Fn2 /C⊥1
∑
x′∈C1
∑
y∈C1
(−1)z1·y|x+ x′ + y〉〈x+ x′|
=
∑
x′∈C1
|x+ x′〉〈x+ x′|,
because y ∈ C1 satisfies
1
|C1|
∑
[z1]∈Fn2 /C⊥1
(−1)z1·y =

 1 if y = 00 if y 6= 0.
Now, we define the minimum error:
P ([z1] ∈ C⊥2 /C⊥1 ,Λ(|0, z1 + z2〉C1 C1〈0, z1 + z2|))
:=min
M
(
1−
∑
[z1]∈C⊥2 /C⊥1
TrM[z1]Λ(|0, z1 + z2〉C1 C1〈0, z1 + z2|))
|C⊥2 /C⊥1 |
)
,
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where M is a POVM {M[z1]}[z1]∈C⊥2 /C⊥1 . Then, we have the following evaluation.
Lemma 6
I([x1] ∈ C1/C2,ΛE( 1|C2|
∑
x2∈C2
|x1 + x2〉〈x1 + x2|))
≤ηm−s
∑
[z2]∈Fn2 /C⊥2
1
|C2|
· P (z1 ∈ C⊥2 /C⊥1 ,Λ(|0, z1 + z2〉C1 C1〈0, z1 + z2|)), (23)
where m = dimC1 and s = dimC2.
Proof: Using Lemma 5 and the convexity of mutual information, we have
I([x1] ∈ C1/C2,ΛE( 1|C2|
∑
x2∈C2
|x1 + x2〉〈x1 + x2|))
=I([x1] ∈ C1/C2,ΛE( 1|C2|
∑
[z2]∈Fn2 /C⊥2
|x1, z2〉C2 C2〈x1, z2|))
≤ 1|C2|
∑
[z2]∈Fn2 /C⊥2
I([x1] ∈ C1/C2,ΛE(|x1, z2〉C2 C2〈x1, z2|)). (24)
Applying Lemma 2, we have
I(x1 ∈ C1/C2, (ΛE(|x1, z2〉C2 C2〈x1, z2|))
≤ηm−sP (z1 ∈ C⊥2 /C⊥1 ,Λ(|0, z1 + z2〉C1 C1〈0, z1 + z2|)).
From (24), the concavity of ηm−s implies
I([x1] ∈ C1/C2,ΛE( 1|C2|
∑
x2∈C2
|x1 + x2〉〈x1 + x2|))
≤ 1|C2|
∑
[z2]∈Fn2 /C⊥2
ηm−sP (z1 ∈ C⊥2 /C⊥1 ,Λ(|0, z1 + z2〉C1 C1〈0, z1 + z2|))
≤ηm−s 1|C2|
∑
[z2]∈Fn2 /C⊥2
P (z1 ∈ C⊥2 /C⊥1 ,Λ(|0, z1 + z2〉C1 C1〈0, z1 + z2|)).
Since Λ is a generalized Pauli channel, any coset [x0] ∈ Fn2/C1 satisfies Λ(|x0, z1 +
z2〉C1 C1〈x0, z1 + z2|)) = Xx0Λ(|0, z1 + z2〉C1 C1〈0, z1 + z2|))(Xx0)†. Hence,
P ([z1] ∈ C⊥2 /C⊥1 ,Λ(|0, z1 + z2〉C1 C1〈0, z1 + z2|))
=P ([z1] ∈ C⊥2 /C⊥1 ,Λ(|x0, z1 + z2〉C1 C1〈x0, z1 + z2|)).
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Thus,
P (z1 ∈ C⊥2 /C⊥1 ,Λ(|0, z1 + z2〉C1 C1〈0, z1 + z2|))
=
|C1|
2n
∑
[x0]∈Fn2 /C1
P (z1 ∈ C⊥2 /C⊥1 ,Λ(|x0, z1 + z2〉C1 C1〈x0, z1 + z2|))
≤P
(
z1 ∈ C⊥2 /C⊥1 ,
|C1|
2n
∑
[x0]∈Fn2 /C1
Λ(|x0, z1 + z2〉C1 C1〈x0, z1 + z2|)
)
=P
(
z1 ∈ C⊥2 /C⊥1 ,
Λ(
|C1|
2n
∑
z0∈C⊥1
|z0 + z1 + z2〉Fn2 Fn2 〈z0 + z1 + z2|)
)
. (25)
Now, we focus on the step (ix) and the subcode G(C1)C2(Y, s) ⊂ C1, and abbreviate
G(C1)C2(Y, s) to C2(Y, s). Then, the dual code C2(Y, s)
⊥ satisfies C⊥1 ⊂ C2(Y, s)⊥ and
the condition of C2(X) in Lemma 1 when t, l and C1 in Lemma 1 is given by n− v, v − s,
and C⊥1 , respectively. Then, n − (l + t) in Lemma 1 is given by s. Since the generalized
Pauli channel can be regarded as the additive channel, we can apply Lemma 1. Hence,
EY
[ 1
|C2(Y, s)|
∑
[z2]∈Fn2 /C2(Y,s)⊥
P
(
z1 ∈ C2(Y, s)⊥/C⊥1 ,
ΛE(
|C1|
2n
∑
z0∈C⊥1
|z0 + z1 + z2〉Fn2 Fn2 〈z0 + z1 + z2|)
)]
≤
n∑
k=0
P˜Wt(k)g(2
−s|n, k). (26)
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From (25), (26), and (23), the convexity of ηm−s yields that
EY
[ 1
|C2|
∑
[z2]∈Fn2 /C⊥2
I([x1] ∈ C1/C2,ΛE(|x1, z2〉C2 C2〈x1, z2|))
]
≤ηm−s
(
EY
[ 1
|C2|
∑
[z2]∈Fn2 /C⊥2
P
(
z1 ∈ C⊥2 /C⊥1 ,Λ(|0, z1 + z2〉C1 C1〈0, z1 + z2|
)])
≤ηm−s
(⌊n/2⌋∑
k=0
P˜Wt(k)g(2
−s|n, k)
)
.
Therefore, from (24), we obtain Theorem 3.
IX. OPTIMAL ATTACK
In this section, we prove that there exists a collective attack attaining the the exponential
rate (4) under a condition. Indeed, it is not so easy to evaluate max I(Z,ZE). Hence, we
treat IH(Z,ZE) instead of I(Z,ZE).
Lemma 7 Assume that the sequence of codes C1,n,k+ satisfies
max
k≤(p+ǫ(p))n
Pe,Wk,n(C
⊥
1,n)→ 0 (27)
where the channel Wk,n is defined on F
n
2 as PWk,n(j) = δk,j. Then, we have
lim
−r
n
log Ek×|pos×,Y+,pos+,k+,Y×
[
max
E
IH(Z,ZE)
]
≤ min
p∈[p,p]
h(p+ rǫ(p))− (1− r)h(p)− rh(p+ ǫ(p)), (28)
where the maximum is taken concerning Eve’s operation E . Note that, the above inequality
holds for any fixed variable Y+.
Hence, if ǫ(p) is sufficiently small and the sequence of codes C1,n satisfies the condition (27),
we have
lim
−r
n
log Epos×,k×,Y+|pos+,k+,Y×
[
max IH(Z,ZE)
]
=h(p+ rǫ(p))− (1− r)h(p)− rh(p+ ǫ(p)). (29)
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This indicates that the method of randomly choosing code C2 is optimal in the sense of large
deviation.
In this lemma, we assume the condition (27). Indeed, we need some conditions in Lemma
7. For example, consider the code C1 that consists of the elements x whose the first n−m
components is zero. In this case, the following proof is not valid. Indeed, when the limit
limn→∞ 1n log |C1,n| is greater than h(p + ǫ(p)) and we choose C1,n randomly, the condition
(27) holds. Hence, the condition (27) is not so unnatural. However, a more natural condition
is needed.
As is shown later, the exponential rate minp∈[p,p] h(p+ rǫ(p))− (1− r)h(p)− rh(p+ ǫ(p))
can be attained by a collective attack, in which Eve’s is allowed only individual unitary
operations to quantum states sent by Alice and any global generalized measurement on the
Eve’s local states. Hence, the exponential rate of Eve’s information cannot be improved by
any collective attack, in which Eve’s is allowed to use any unitary operation to all quantum
states sent by Alice.
Now, we construct Eve’s strategy attaining the bound minp∈[p,p] h(p+rǫ(p))−(1−r)h(p)−
rh(p+ǫ(p)) and prove (28). Choose p0 := argminp∈[p,p] h(p+rǫ(p))−(1−r)h(p)−rh(p+ǫ(p)).
Eve performs a unitary action Up0+rǫ(p0)
Up|x〉 ⊗ |0〉E := √p|x〉 ⊗ |0〉E + (−1)x
√
1− p|x〉 ⊗ |1〉E
for a every qubit, where |x〉E is Eve’s state.
We define the unitary U˜k:
U˜nk |x〉 ⊗ |0〉E :=
√
1(
n
k
) ∑
y∈Fn2 :|x|=k
(−1)x·y|x〉 ⊗ |y〉E.
We can easily show that
H
(
ΛkE,k
( ∑
x∈C1,n
|x〉〈x|
))
=H
(
ΛkE,k
( ∑
x∈C1,n
|y + x〉〈y + x|
))
for y ∈ Fn2 .
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Hence, applying Lemma 6 to the case of C1 = F
n
2 , C2 = C1,n, we have
log
(
n
k
)
−H
(
ΛnE,k
( ∑
x∈C1,n
|x〉〈x|
))
=H
(
ΛnE,k
(∑
x∈Fn2
|x〉〈x|
))
−H
(
ΛnE,k
( ∑
x∈C1,n
|x〉〈x|
))
≤h(Pe,Wk,n(C⊥1,n)) + log |C1,n|Pe,Wk,n(C⊥1,n),
where
ΛnE,k(ρ) := TrB U˜
n
k (ρ⊗ |0〉E E〈0|)(U˜nk )†.
Now, we evaluate Eve’s information. In this case, the subcode C2,n,k× depends on the
outcome k×. Taking the pinching map: ρ 7→
∑
k Pn,kρPn,k (Pn,k is the projection to the
space spanned by {|x〉}|x|=k), we have
H
(
Ek×
[
Λ⊗nE
( ∑
x∈C1,n
|x〉〈x|
)])
−
∑
[x]2∈C1,n/C2,n,k×
H
(
Λ⊗nE
( ∑
y∈C2,n,k×
|x+ y〉〈x+ y|
))
≥H
(
Ek×,k
[
ΛnE,k
( ∑
x∈C1,n
|x〉〈x|
)])
−
∑
[x]2∈C1,n/C2,n,k×
H
(
ΛnE,k
( ∑
y∈C2,n,k×
|x+ y〉〈x+ y|
))
,
where k is the random variable with distribution P˜ (k) :=
(
n
k
)
(p0+rǫ(p0))
k(1−p0−rǫ(p0))n−k.
When k = n(p0 + ǫ(p0) + ǫ), k× = p0, we have
1
n
H
(
ΛnE,k
( ∑
x∈C1,n
|x〉〈x|
))
− 1
n
∑
[x]2∈C1,n/C2,n,k×
H
(
ΛnE,k
( ∑
y∈C2,n,k×
|x+ y〉〈x+ y|
))
≥1
n
(
log
(
n
k
)
− h(Pe,Wk,n(C⊥1,n))− log |C1,n|Pe,Wk,n(C⊥1,n)− log |C2,n,k×|
)
=
1
n
(
log
(
n
k
)
− nh(k×
n
+ ǫ(
k×
n
))− h(Pe,Wk,n(C⊥1,n))− log |C1,n|Pe,Wk,n(C⊥1,n)
)
→h(p0 + ǫ(p0) + ǫ)− h(p0 + ǫ(p0)) as n→∞.
30
Hence, Eve’s information can be bounded as
Ek×

H(Λ⊗nE ( ∑
x∈C1,n
|x〉〈x|)))−
∑
[x]2∈C1,n/C2,n,k×
H(Λ⊗nE (
∑
y∈C2,n,k×
|x+ y〉〈x+ y|))


≥
(
n
n(p0 + ǫ(p0) + ǫ)
)
(p0 + rǫ(p0))
n(p0+ǫ(p0)+ǫ)(1− p0 − rǫ(p0))n−n(p0+ǫ(p0)+ǫ)
·
(
l
lp0
)
(p0 + rǫ(p0))
lp0(1− p0 − rǫ(p0))l(1−p0)(n(h(p0 + ǫ(p0) + ǫ)− h(p0 + ǫ(p0))) + o(n))
≥n(h(p0 + ǫ(p0) + ǫ)− h(p0 + ǫ(p0))) + o(n)
(n+ 1)2
2−nd(p0+ǫ(p0)+ǫ‖p0+rǫ(p0))−ld(p0‖p0+rǫ(p0)).
Thus, we obtain
lim
−r
n
log Ek×|pos×,Y+,pos+,k+,Y×
[
max IH
(
Z+, ZE
)]
≤h(p0 + rǫ(p0))− (1− r)h(p0)− rh(p0 + ǫ(p0) + ǫ).
Taking the limit ǫ→ 0, we obtain (28).
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we obtained a practical evaluation of security of quantum key distribution.
This bound improves existing bounds. In order to guarantee the security of implemented
QKD system, we need a tighter bound in the finite-coding length. Hence, our bound is useful
for guaranteeing the security of quantum key distribution with perfect single photon source.
However, for a precise evaluation, we have to treat hypergeometric distributions, because
our bound contains hypergeometric distributions. Hence, it is needed to calculate these
bounds by numerical analysis based on several calculations of hypergeometric distributions.
We also derived the exponential rate of our bound as (4), and proved its optimality with
in the sense of Holevo information with a class of one-way communication when Cp is less
than the critical case. However, our condition for our code is not sufficiently natural. Hence,
it is required to prove this optimality under a more natural condition. One candidate of a
more natural condition is
max
k≤h¯−1(1−h(p+ǫ(p)))n
Pe,Wk,n(C
⊥
1,n)→ 0. (30)
Hence, it is a future problem to show the optimality under the above condition.
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Further, we assumed that perfect single photon source. One idea for the weak coherent
case is the decoy method [23], which is based on the observation of the security with imperfect
devices[24]. However, any existing paper [25, 26, 27] of the decoy method does not discuss
the degree of Eve’s information in the framework of finite coding-length, precisely. Hence,
it is required to extend our result to the weak coherent case with the decoy method.
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APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF (3)
Now, we prove (3). In the following, we denote n + l by m and fix p ∈ [p, p]. We treat
the case of j = pm, and define the number kp(m) := max{k|h(pm−kn ) − h(kl + δk) ≥ 0}. In
this case, the first term of P˜ (δ, n, l, k, k) goes to 0. Hence, we focus on the second term of
P˜ (δ, n, l, k, k), which is divided as
P˜2(δ, n, l, k, k)
:=
k∑
k=0
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk×)
+
k∑
k=k+1
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk×)
=
kp(m)∑
k=0
Phg(k|n, l, j)
+
k∑
k=kp(m)+1
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk×).
Since h(pm−kp(m)
n
) = h(kp(m)
l
+ δk), we have kp(m) = pl − nlmδk. Using the relation δk =
ǫ˜k/l√
m
and the continuity of Cp, we have kp(m) = (1 − r)pm − r(1 − r)ǫ˜(p)
√
m + o(
√
m). The
average of k is lj
n+l
= (1− r)pm and the variance of k is jln(n+l−j)
(n+l)2(n+l−1) =
r(1−r)p(1−p)m
1− 1
m
. Hence,
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kp(m)−(1−r)pm√
r(1−r)p(1−p)m
1− 1m
→ −
√
r(1−r)√
p(1−p) ǫ˜(p). Thus, we have
kp(m)∑
k=0
Phg(k|n, l, j) = Φ
(
−
√
r(1− r)√
p(1− p) ǫ˜(p)
)
.
When k ≥ kp(m), we can approximate the difference as
h(
j − k
n
)− h(k
l
+ δk) ∼= −h′(p) l + n
ln
(k − kp(m)).
Hence,
k∑
k=kp(m)+1
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk×)
∼= 1√
2π r(1−r)p(1−p)m
1− 1
m
·
∫ k
kp(m)
e
− (x−(1−r)pm)2
2
r(1−r)p(1−p)m
1− 1m 2−nh
′(p) l+n
ln
(x−kp(m))dx
∼= 1
2π
∫ +∞
−
√
r(1−r)√
p(1−p) ǫ˜(p)
e−
x2
2 2
−√mh′(p)
√
rp(1−p)√
1−r (y+
√
r(1−r)√
p(1−p) ǫ˜(p))
·
√
r(1− r)p(1− p)mdy
→0 as m→∞,
where y = x−(1−r)pm√
r(1−r)p(1−p)m .
Next, we consider the case when j
m
is strictly smaller than p. The value−h( j−k
n
)+h(k
l
+δk)
is strictly positive and −h( j−k
n
) + h(k
l
+ δk) is smaller than this value if k ≥ k. Hence,
P˜2(δ, n, l, k, k) goes to 0.
Finally, we consider the case when j
m
is strictly greater than p. In this case, as is mentioned
in B, the probability that k is greater than k exponentially goes to 0. Hence, in this case
P˜ (δ, n, l, k, k) goes to 0. Therefore, we obtain (3).
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APPENDIX B: DERIVATION OF (4)
From (9), we have
1
(n+ 1)(l + 1)
2lh(
k
l
)+nh( j−k
n
)−(n+l)h( j
n+l
) ≤ Phg(k|n, l, j)
=
(
l
k
)(
n
j−k
)
(
n+l
j
) ≤ (n+ l + 1)2lh(kl )+nh( j−kn )−(n+l)h( jn+l ).
Hence,
max
j
k∑
k=0
[
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk×)
+
k∑
k=k+1
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk×)
]
≤k(n+ l + 1)
· 2maxj,k lh(kl )+nh( j−kn )−(n+l)h( jn+l )−n[h(kl +δk)−h( j−kn )]+ .
Further,
max
j
[ k∑
k=0
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk×)
· n(R− h(k
l
+ δk×))
+
k∑
k=k+1
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk×)
· n(R− h(k
l
+ δk×))
]
,
≤n(R− h(p+ ǫ(p)))k(n+ l + 1)
· 2maxj,k lh(kl )+nh( j−kn )−(n+l)h( jn+l )−n[h(kl +δk)−h( j−kn )]+ .
Thus, substituting p = k
l
, r = n
n+l
, ǫ(p) = δk, ǫ
′ = k
l
− δk − j−kn , we obtain (5). Since
−r
n
max
j,k
[
lh(
k
l
) + nh(
j − k
n
)− (n+ l)h( j
n + l
)
− n[h(k
l
+ δk)− h(j − k
n
)]+
]
≤E(ǫ, r, p, p), (B1)
we obtain the part ≤ in (4).
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Conversely,
max
j
[ k∑
k=0
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk×)
+
k∑
k=k+1
Phg(k|n, l, j)f(j − k, k|n, l, δk×)
]
≥2
maxj,k lh(
k
l
)+nh( j−k
n
)−(n+l)h( j
n+l
)−n[h(k
l
+δk)−h( j−kn )]+
(n + 1)(l + 1)
.
Since the equality in (B1) holds in the limit n→∞, we obtain the part ≥ in (4).
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF (15) AND (16)
When Alice sends the classical information x +X+ (x = G(C1)Z), the probability that
Bob obtains the local signal xb := x+X+ − X˜+ is
Tr
1
2n+l
∑
x′k∈Fn2
∑
z′c∈Fl2
Λpos(|x′k〉〈x′k| ⊗ |z′c〉Fn2 Fn2 〈z′c|)|x′k + x− xb〉〈x′k + x− xb| ⊗ |z′c − z〉Fn2 Fn2 〈z′c − z|)
Tr 1
2l
∑
x′c∈Fl2 Λ
pos(ρmix,n ⊗ |z′c〉Fn2 Fn2 〈z′c|)I ⊗ |z′c − z〉Fn2 Fn2 〈z′c − z|)
=
Tr
1
2n+l
∑
x′′k∈Fn2
∑
z′c∈Fl2
Λpos(|x′′k − xb〉〈x′′k − xb| ⊗ |z′c〉Fn2 Fn2 〈z′c|)|x′′k − xb〉〈x′′k − xb| ⊗ |z′c − z〉Fn2 Fn2 〈z′c − z|)
Tr 1
2l
∑
x′c∈Fl2 Λ
pos(ρmix,n ⊗ |z′c〉Fn2 Fn2 〈z′c|)I ⊗ |z′c − z〉Fn2 Fn2 〈z′c − z|)
=
Tr 1
2n+l
∑
x′′k∈Fn2
∑
z′c∈Fl2(Λ
pos)(x
′′
k0,0z
′
c)(| − xb〉〈−xb| ⊗ |0〉Fn2 Fn2 〈0|)| − xb〉〈−xb| ⊗ | − z〉Fn2 Fn2 〈−z|)
Tr 1
2l
∑
x′c∈Fl2 Λ
pos(ρmix,n ⊗ |0〉Fn2 Fn2 〈0|)I ⊗ | − z〉Fn2 Fn2 〈−z|)
=
Tr 1
22(n+l)
∑
x′′,z′′∈Fn+l2 (Λ
pos)(x
′′,z′′)(| − xb〉〈−xb| ⊗ |0〉Fn2 Fn2 〈0|)| − xb〉〈−xb| ⊗ | − z〉Fn2 Fn2 〈−z|)
Tr 1
22(n+l)
∑
x′′,z′′∈Fn+l2 (Λ
pos)(x′′,z′′)(ρmix,n ⊗ |0〉Fn2 Fn2 〈0|)I ⊗ | − z〉Fn2 Fn2 〈−z|)
=
Tr(Λt)
pos(| − x〉〈−x| ⊗ |0〉Fn2 Fn2 〈0|)| − xb〉〈−xb| ⊗ | − z〉Fn2 Fn2 〈−z|
Tr(Λt)pos(ρmix,n ⊗ |0〉Fn2 Fn2 〈0|)I ⊗ | − z〉Fn2 Fn2 〈−z|)
(C1)
=Tr(Λt)
pos,z(| − x〉〈−x|)| − xb〉〈−xb|,
where
(Λt)
pos,zc(ρ)
:=
∑
xk,zk∈Fn2
P(Λt)pos,k|Z,c(xk, zk|zc)XxkZzkρ(XxkZzk)†.
In the derivation of (C1), we use (13).
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In this case, we can regard that Bob measures the state (Λt)
pos,z(| − x〉〈−x|). Hence,
Eve’s state can be regarded as ((Λt)
pos,z)E(| − x〉〈−x|). Hence, applying Theorem 3, we
obtain (15) and (16).
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APPENDIX D: PROOF OF (17) AND (18)
First, we evaluate EposEzcEY+
[
I([z] ∈ C1/C2(Y+, nh(|zc|/l + δ|zc|)), ρC1/C2(Y )(Λt)pos,z ,E([z]))
]
as
EposEzcEY+
[
I([z] ∈ C1/C2(Y+, nh(|zc|/l + δ|zc|)), ρC1/C2(Y )(Λt)pos,z ,E([z]))
]
≤Epos
[∑
|zc|<k
P(Λt)pos,Z,c(zc)h
( n∑
kk=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z(kk|zc)f(kk, k|n, l, δk)
)
+
∑
k≤|zc|≤k
P(Λt)pos,Z,c(zc)h
( n∑
kk=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z(kk|zc)f(kk, |zc| |n, l, δ|zc|)
)]
+ Epos
[∑
|zc|<k
P(Λt)pos,Z,c(zc)n(R − h(k/l + δk))
n∑
kk=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z(kk|zc)f(kk, k|n, l, δk)
+
∑
k≤|zc|≤k
P(Λt)pos,Z,c(zc)n(R − h(|zc|/l + δ|zc|))
n∑
kk=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z(kk|zc)f(kk, |zc| |n, l, δ|zc|)
]
(D1)
≤h
(
Epos
[∑
|zc|<k
P(Λt)pos,Z,c(zc)
n∑
kk=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z(kk|zc)f(kk, k|n, l, δk)
+
∑
k≤|zc|≤k
P(Λt)pos,Z,c(zc)
n∑
kk=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z(kk|zc)f(kk, |zc| |n, l, δ|zc|)
])
+ Epos
[∑
|zc|<k
P(Λt)pos,Z,c(zc)n(R − h(k/l + δk))
n∑
kk=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z(kk|zc)f(kk, k|n, l, δk)
+
∑
k≤|zc|≤k
P(Λt)pos,Z,c(zc)n(R − h(|zc|/l + δ|zc|))
n∑
kk=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z(kk|zc)f(kk, |zc| |n, l, δk)
]
(D2)
=h
( n∑
kk=0
k∑
kc=0
Epos
[
P˜(Λt)pos,Z,k,c(kk, kc)f(kk, k|n, l, δk)
]
+
n∑
kk=0
k∑
kc=k+1
Epos
[
P˜(Λt)pos,Z,k,c(kk, kc)f(kk, kc|n, l, δkc)
])
+
n∑
kk=0
k∑
kc=0
Epos
[
P˜(Λt)pos,Z,k,c(kk, kc)n(R− h(k/l + δk))f(kk, k|n, l, δk)
]
+
n∑
kk=0
k∑
kc=k+1
Epos
[
P˜(Λt)pos,Z,k,c(kk, kc)n(R− h(kc/l + δkc))f(kk, kc|n, l, δk+c)
]
(D3)
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Further, RHS of (D3) is evaluated as
(RHS of (D3))
=h
( n∑
kk=0
k∑
kc=0
P˜(Λt),Z(kk + kc)Phg(kc|n, l, kk + kc)f(kk, k|n, l, δk)
+
n∑
kk=0
k∑
kc=k+1
P˜(Λt),Z(kk + kc)Phg(kc|n, l, kk + kc)f(kk, kc|n, l, δkc)
)
+
n∑
kk=0
k∑
kc=0
P˜(Λt),Z(kk + kc)Phg(kc|n, l, kk + kc)n(R− h(k/l + δk))f(kk, k|n, l, δk)
+
n∑
kk=0
k∑
kc=k+1
P˜(Λt),Z(kk + kc)Phg(kc|n, l, kk + kc)n(R− h(kc/l + δkc))f(kk, kc|n, l, δk+c)
(D4)
≤h
(
max
j
[ k∑
kc=0
Phg(kc|n, l, j)f(kk, k|n, l, δk) +
k∑
kc=k+1
Phg(kc|n, l, j)f(kk, kc|n, l, δkc)
])
+max
j
[ k∑
kc=0
Phg(kc|n, l, j)n(R− h(k/l + δk))f(kk, k|n, l, δk)
+
k∑
kc=k+1
Phg(kc|n, l, j)n(R− h(kc/l + δkc))f(kk, kc|n, l, δk+c)
]
. (D5)
In the above relations, (D1) follows from (15) and (16), and (D2) follows from the con-
vexity of h¯, (D4) follows from (14), (D5) follows by replacing kk+kc by j. Hence, we obtain
(17).
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Similarly, we have
EposEzcEY+
[I([z] ∈ C1/C2(Y+, nh(|zc|/l + δ|zc|)), ρC1/C2(Y )(Λt)pos,z,E([z]))
n(R− h(k×/l× + δk×))
]
≤ 1
n(R − h(k/l× + δk))
Epos
[∑
|zc|<k
P(Λt)pos,Z,c(zc)h
( n∑
kk=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z(kk|zc)f(kk, k|n, l, δk)
)
+
∑
k≤|zc|≤k
P(Λt)pos,Z,c(zc)h
( n∑
kk=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z(kk|zc)f(kk, |zc| |n, l, δ|zc|)
)]
+ Epos
[∑
|zc|<k
P(Λt)pos,Z,c(zc)
n∑
kk=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z(kk|zc)f(kk, k|n, l, δk)
+
∑
k≤|zc|≤k
P(Λt)pos,Z,c(zc)
n∑
kk=0
P˜(Λt)pos,Z(kk|zc)f(kk, |zc| |n, l, δ|zc|)
]
≤ 1
n(R − h(k/l× + δk))
h
(
max
j
[ k∑
kc=0
Phg(kc|n, l, j)f(kk, k|n, l, δk) +
k∑
kc=k+1
Phg(kc|n, l, j)f(kk, kc|n, l, δkc)
])
+max
j
[ k∑
kc=0
Phg(kc|n, l, j)f(kk, k|n, l, δk) +
k∑
kc=k+1
Phg(kc|n, l, j)f(kk, kc|n, l, δk+c)
]
.
Hence, we obtain (18).
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